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sensitive to the price of private labels, indicating a lesser attachment to these 
brand names. 
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1.  Introduction 
The development of retailers' brands in France, commonly named Private Labels (PLs), 
remains 30 years after their creation a topical phenomenon. A recent study  emphasizes that 
their development is continuing (Moati, 2008). These PLs currently represent 29% in value of 
the sales of consumer products by the mass retail industry, and 24% in volume.2 Although 
these figures do not reveal the high degree of heterogeneity that exists from department to 
department and from retail company to retail company, what they do indicate is that PLs have 
become an inescapable part of what is on offer in supermarkets.  
 
[Table 1 here ] 
 
The evolution of brands has been linked to the strategy adopted by the mass retailers 
to compete more and more directly with National Brands (NB) in terms of quality. The 
strategy initially adopted, which rested exclusively on price-based competition (Carrefour’s 
“free products”, 1976), has been abandoned in favor of competition based on two dimensions: 
prices and quality.3 One of the driving forces behind this evolution is tariff negotiation with 
the manufacturers of NBs. The introduction of high quality private label products constitutes a 
strategic threat to industrialists, causing them to lower their prices (Bontems, Monier and 
Réquillart, 1999; Caprice, 2000). The improvement in the quality of private brands has also 
been facilitated by a better control of the production costs of private label products (Mills, 
1995; Bontems, Monier and Réquillart, 1999).  
 
                                                 
2
 This difference can be explained by the fact that PLs are sold at an average price that is lower than the average 
prices of the products displayed in the department. 
3
 The “generic” brand was then attributed to low-quality products, which are less linked to the reputation of the 
retail store.  These “generic” brands are used by the mass retail stores to slow down the growth of hard discount.  
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 The “quality” option led, in the 1990s, to the appearance on the market of “me too” 
retail brands. “Me too” wares represent the largest part of mass retailers’ offering and through 
them retail companies offer products that are competitive both in terms of quality – the quality 
of these products is significantly higher than that of the first generation of private labels - and 
in terms of price: indeed, private label prices are on average 20% lower than those of NBs. 
Since the early 2000s, retail companies have developed a second quality based strategy 
through “upmarket” private label ranges for certain niche markets (emphasis on the qualities 
of the land where the goods are produced, on their flavours, etc).4 We shall call the standard 
private label SPL and the high quality private labels HPL. The objective of this study is to 
assess consumer perception of this two-faceted strategy adopted by the mass retail industry to 
compete with national brands. The second section presents an overview of some previous 
studies related to perception of PLs versus NBs. The third section is dedicated to the method 
and the fourth section to the data. In the fifth section, we present the results. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The questions related to consumer perception of PLs and to what motivates them to buy these 
labels have been the topic of much research work (for a review of the literature, Bergès-
Sennou, Bontems and Réquillart, 2004). Studies using early 1990s data reveal that socio-
demographic characteristics have an effect on the purchase of PLs. It was found that high 
incomes decrease the consumers’ probability of buying a PL product (Richardson et al, 1996, 
Dhar and Hoch, 1997), while on the contrary the size of the household (Richardson et 
al,1996) and the level of education (Binkley et al., 2001) have a positive influence on their 
probability of buying PLs. However, using more recent data, Cataluña, Garcia and Phau 
                                                 
4
 For example, the Leclerc group introduced a range called “Nos régions ont du talent”; Carrefour introduced a 
“Reflets de France” range and Casino has a “Destinations Saveurs” brand, etc. They correspond to the UK 
equivalents "Tesco's finest" or Sainsbury's "Taste the difference". 
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(2006) or Bergès et al. (2009) conclude that socio-demographic variables have no strong 
influence on the purchase of PLs.  
Experimental economics shows that NBs often enjoy an advantage over PLs in terms of 
perceived quality (Richardson, Dick and Jain, 1994; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007). This 
advantage rests less on the intrinsic quality of the products – which, in blind tests, are often 
difficult to differentiate – than on reputation. Thus, these brands are for the most part 
differentiated vertically: given equal prices, the majority of consumers choose NBs over PLs. 
PLs are therefore chosen by consumers partly because of their price advantage. However, a 
number of studies put this price effect into perspective, showing that it varies from product to 
product: in some cases (orange juice), consumers remain loyal to the PL even when the price 
differential decreases (Livesey and Lennon, 1978). In the same vein, Baltas (1997) and 
Chardon and Dumartin (1998) indicate that buyers of PLs consider that the intrinsic quality of 
these PL products is satisfactory. 
A consumer’s preference for a NB over a PL is often related to the perceived purchasing 
risk (Batra and Sinha, 2000; Erdem, Zhao and Valenzuela, 2004). This parameter plays a 
significant role both at individual and at sector level. In the latter case, it partly explains why 
the penetration rate of PLs varies according to the nature of products: high in the case of some 
staple goods (UHT milk, pasta products, etc…) but low in the case of products for which 
consumer trust is absolutely essential (baby food, cosmetics). This characteristic certainly 
contributes to lowering consumers’ price sensitivity for the benefit of NBs. Nevertheless, it 
varies from individual to individual and from product to product and should logically decrease 
with the improvement of the intrinsic quality of PL products and their increasing availability.  
Indeed, results vary according to the period studied and to the establishment of the PLs. In 
a study of the American orange juice market in the early 1990s, Binkley et al (2001) find that 
NBs have lower price elasticity than PLs, especially in the case of the upmarket segment of 
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refrigerated orange juice. Conversely, in a more recent study about pasta products in France 
sold by a famous retailer – where PLs are more strongly established than on the American 
market – Bergès, Hassan and Monier-Dilhan (2009) observe that consumers’ willingness to 
pay for a PL product is higher than their willingness to pay for the leading NBs.  
 
3. Method and Data 
Part A focuses on the methodological choices intended to measure consumers’ attachment to 
brands. Part B lists the products and the retailers involved in the analysis and presents the data 
used. Part C explains the demand model (AIDS). 
 
3.A  Demand price elasticity: a measure of consumers’ attachment to brands 
This paper aims to compare consumers’ global attachment to NBs and PLs. We capture the 
attachment to brands throughout the own-price elasticities of demand. The own-price 
elasticity of demand for a given good measures consumers’ reactions to the price variations of 
that good in terms of purchased quantity : The stronger the consumers’ attachment to the 
product, the lower the variation in the demand to price variations and the weaker the demand 
price elasticity (in absolute value).  
Marketing researchers (Merunka, Changeur and Bourgeat, 1999) question the ability 
of demand price elasticities to measure consumer loyalty to products. They point out that 
demand variations may occur not only in reaction to prices: For example, they can translate a 
reduction of the shelf space devoted to the product by the retailer. Nevertheless, such risk is 
reduced when the number of retailers taken into account increases or the period of time is 
extended.  
Another concern is whether the brand elasticities hierarchy provides a good picture of 
that of consumers’ attachment to brands. This question comes down to the relationship 
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existing between perceived quality and demand price elasticity. Theoretical studies have 
examined the question from the supply viewpoint (for a review of the literature, see Coibion, 
Einav and Hallav, 2007). These studies endeavour to determine the conditions under which a 
firm offering two qualities can gain higher profit margins with its “upmarket” products – not 
only in absolute but also in relative value – than with its generic quality products . In their 
pioneering study, Mussa and Rosen (1978) analyse the behaviour of a monopoly firm offering 
two qualities differentiated according to a price sensibility parameter. They show that 
although the profit margins associated with the high quality goods are, in absolute value, 
higher that those of the generic quality products, their relative value is lower. 
Reopening Mussa and Rosen’s analysis (1978), Verboven (1999) finds in a context of 
duopoly the demand price elasticity of the high quality shorter, in absolute value, than that of 
the generic quality. According to Verboven, two elements can lead to lower elasticities for the 
upmarket product: the attachment of the consumers to brands selling high quality products 
(advertising) and the ability of enterprises to make the information about high quality 
products’ prices costly for the consumer. In the context of the competition between NBs and 
PLs, let’s notice that if the former favours NBs, the latter must benefit PLs. Indeed, 
comparing prices between retail companies is easier in the case of NB products, the 
characteristics of which do not vary from one retailer to the next, than it is in the case of PL 
products which are designed by the retailer.  
 Most empirical studies on the demand for differentiated goods find that direct price 
elasticities are lower for “high quality” products. Investigating the beer market, Hausman, 
Leonard and Zona (1994) explained this finding by the fact that consumers of high quality 
products are less sensitive to prices than other consumers with lower incomes. On the 
American automobile market, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) found also that upmarket 
cars had the lowest direct price elasticity of demand. Nevertheless, in this example, the 
Page 7 
highest elasticities are not necessarily associated with the cheapest cars. They are observed for 
goods on the intermediary segment, i.e. goods the supply of which is the densest. Before 
presenting the model used to compute price elasticities, we describe the data used. 
 
3.B  The Data 
Contrary to some previous papers (Binkley et al., 2001 or Bergès, Hassan and Monier-Dilhan, 
2009), the present investigation does not rely on a single example (one product sold by one 
retailer). To bring out more basic features, several products are considered (tree products, see 
below). Moreover, as PLs are retailer-dependent in terms of many parameters (quality, 
packaging, price, date at which the product was introduced on the shelves, etc…), it is useful 
to consider several retailers. This study incorporates three of the five largest French mass 
distributors.  
The economic data we have used here are drawn from the TNS Worldpanel database. 
This database comes from a panel of approximately 10,000 households where consumers 
home scan their purchases and thus provide information on value and quantity of food 
products bought as well as where the products were purchased, their brand, their price and 
other information about the offer variables (the characteristics of the product, possible 
promotional campaign, etc).  
The high-quality private labels were recently introduced. In the TNS World Panel 
database, the year 2004 is one of the first years in which upmarket private labels appear for a 
significant number of products and retail companies. The analysis shall therefore focus on the 
2004-2005 period and on three staple products: pasta, biscuits and jam. These three products 
comply with the double constraint related to their existence and numerous purchases. Indeed, 
for each retail group and each product, it is necessary to observe both a standard private label 
and a high-quality private label. Moreover, the number of purchases must be high enough to 
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estimate a demand system while ensuring that the important problem related to the non- 
purchase of some commodities be prevented. 
PLs being by definition specific to each retailer, we have distinguished three retail 
companies. This choice was determined by their weight in the mass food retail industry : 
These three retail groups represented in 2007 45% of the cumulated sales of food products. 
This choice also takes into account diversities in terms of PLs positioning, of communication 
on this market section and of possible historical advantage.  
 For each retail group, we have distinguished various categories of offer: 
- The leading National Brands (NBs): this category comprises the three national brands 
with the largest market shares.1 
- The standard private labels (SPL): these are the “me-too” products competing directly 
with NB products.  
- The high-quality private labels (HPL): these are the retailers’ own products sold under 
niche private labels at prices that are mostly higher than those of the equivalent NB 
products.  
- The other national brands (ONB): this category is composed of branded products 
which are neither NBs nor the lowest price products. They are generally upmarket 
niche products.2  
- The low  price products (LP): this category includes the cheapest generic products 
offered by each retailer. They are sold at lower prices than those of SPL and are 
supposed to compete with products offered by hard discount retailers.  
 Table 2 indicates, for each product and each retail group, the market share in volume 
as well as the average price (and standard deviation) for each category of goods. 
 
                                                 
1
 These are Lustucru, Barilla and Panzani for pasta; LU, BN and Delacre for biscuits, and Confipote, Bonne 
Maman and Andros for jam. 
2
  Croix de Savoie for pasta, Balhsen for biscuits, or Chivers for jam. 
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[Table 2 here ] 
 
 We note a high level of price competition between retailers within the NB segment, 
whatever the product. This is also the case for the various retailers’ SPL products, but not for 
HPL. On average, the price difference between the NBs and the SPL is 36% for pasta 
products, 23% for biscuits and 30% for jam products. Inversely, the prices of NBs are lower 
than those of HPL by 30% to 40%, with some exceptions, however, depending on the product. 
On the other hand, the prices of HPL products are close to those of ONB products, with which 
they compete in the high quality segment. The different products therefore reflect the 
segmentation according to prices implemented by large retailer groups. We observe first the 
low-price products, then the standard private labels, followed by the leading NBs and finally 
the “up-market” private label products and the other NBs.  
 In 2004-2005, the NBs dominated the market, either in absolute (they accounted for 
over 60% of the pasta market shares) or in relative value, with market shares ranging from 
35% to 48% for biscuits and jam products respectively. SPL only take the dominant position 
in 1 case out of 9 (jam sold by retailer 2). The assortment of SPL slightly varies from one 
retailer to the next, but it does vary more significantly from product to product, with a very 
high degree of presence in the case of jam. The market shares of SPL range between 16% 
(pasta in retailer 3) and 31.5% (biscuits, retailer 1). In 2004-2005, HPL were still niche 
products, with a market share of 4.5% on average. Retailer 2 is at the forefront of the 
distribution of this kind of product, and jam products constitute, as for SPL, the most 
favorable segment to HPL products. The market shares held by the “low-price” products and 
the heterogeneous group of other national brands are non negligible (on average 7.3% and 
12% respectively) but vary significantly from product to product and from one retailer to the 
next. 
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 Distinguishing the different retailers and products, we calculate the price elasticities 
for the five kinds of product categories we have identified. 
 
3.C The Demand Model (AIDS) 
Elasticities are computed using the estimated parameters of an Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS; Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980). In the last two decades, this model has been widely 
used in research studies on the demand for food products (see among others Eales and 
Unnevehr, 1988; Moschini and Mielke, 1989; Moschini, Moro and Green, 1994; Eales and 
Henderson, 2001). Like other demand systems (Translog, Rotterdam…), AIDS is both 
flexible and computationally easy to estimate. Moreover, since it does not start from some 
arbitrary preference system but from a specific class of preferences (PIGLOG) which permits 
exact aggregation over consumers, AIDS makes it possible the representation of market 
demands as if they were the outcome of decisions by a rational representative consumer. 
A limitation of demand models is they cannot include a high number of alternatives, 
the number of cross price elasticities growing exponentially with the number of products. This 
limitation can however be overcome thanks to the weak separability hypothesis. This makes it 
possible to model budget allocation decision like a sequential choice process. Only the 
choices between products belonging to the same category are made simultaneously. For staple 
food products, this model seems acceptable: the consumer buys these products regularly 
without really making a choice between these and other expenses. Once s/he has made the 
decision to purchase a product, s/he then chooses the brand: In the present study, we are 
interested in the second stage of the choice process. Moreover, demand systems allow for the 
purchase of variable quantities of each product. In the case of low-price everyday products, 
this feature is more suitable than the assumption of a unitary demand specific to choice 
models (more adapted to durable expensive goods such as automobiles, see Pinkse and Slade, 
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2004). 
The households panel is representative of the French population in income and 
profession, and the data are rich and wide in terms of information. Therefore, we can 
aggregate individual data for 2004 and 2005 on a weekly time path to observe the purchasing 
behavior of a (composite) national representative consumer. For each product and each 
retailer, we thus have a series of 104 observations, including in particular the total expense on 
the product considered, its distribution between the different brands, and retail prices. We also 
introduce a variable reflecting promotional intensity. Indeed, promotions can influence the 
budget decisions of the representative consumer. Since we observe the final decision of 
consumers, part of the effect is therefore already integrated into the data, whether they are 
price or quantity promotions. However, the promotional impact is not limited to this direct 
effect; it also relies on the announcement effect. The Promo variable is constructed from the 
item of information indicating, for each purchase, whether the household bought the product 
while it was on promotion. We then calculate for each week, for a given retailer and a given 
product, the distribution of the promotions between the 5 groups of brands. We denote Promoi 
the promotion rate of product i in relation to its competitors (thus, for each week, 
∑Promoi=1). Promotions are present in all categories of products, though the promotion rate 
of HPL is low. Table 3 indicates the distribution of promotion rates per brand, retailer and 
product during the 2004-2005 period.  
[Table 3 here ] 
 It is not surprising to observe that the promotion rates for NB and ONB products are 
identical among the various retailers because there are usually coordinated national 
campaigns. However, this rate is heterogeneous for SPL and to a lesser extent for HPL, 
depending on each retailer specific policy. 
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 The demand model takes the form of a system of equations written in the following 
way for each product and each retailer company:  
ititittiit
j
ijiit PYpw ρθβγα ++++= ∑
=
Promo )/log(log
5
1
   (1) 
where the dependent variables are the weekly market share of each brand in the weekly 
budget of the representative household (wit with i=1,...,5 and t=1,..., 104). Nine independent 
demand systems are estimated, one for each product sold in each retailer company.  
 The independent variables are the weekly prices of the 5 brands ( itp ), the total 
expense for the product considered in the retail store studied ( tY ), corrected by an index of 
average prices ( tP ) and itρ is the error term. The translog price index tP  (where 
log jtit
n
j
ij
n
i
it
i
it pppP logloglog0 ∑∑∑ ++= γαα ) is, as suggested by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), replaced by a linear approximation defined by the Stone 
index ( ip
i
iwtP loglog ∑= ). To overcome the simultaneity problem related to the presence of 
itw  in both terms of equation (1), itw  is substituted by the iw  mean in the Stone index. We 
impose the theoretical restrictions of additivity of budget shares ( 1=∑
i
iα ), of homogeneity 
and of symmetry ( 0=== ∑∑∑
i
i
j
ji
i
ij βγγ ). Resulting from the additivity hypothesis, only 
four budget share equations are estimated.6 Furthermore, the prices and expenses are 
normalized by their means (Asche and Wessells, 1997).  
The price elasticities (direct and cross) are then calculated from the coefficients 
estimated in the share regressions, using Green and Alston’s tests (1990). The formulas for 
this calculation are the following:  
                                                 
6
 Using an iterative procedure ensures the independence of the results in relation to the omitted product (Prais-
Winsten regression in the Stata software). 
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Direct price elasticity: )(11 iii
i
i
w
βγε −+−=
 
Cross price elasticity: )(11 jiij
i
ij w
w
βγε −+−=
 
where iε  and ijε  denote the direct price elasticity of product i, and the cross price elasticity of 
i in relation to the price of j, respectively. These elasticities are calculated at the mean value.  
 
4. Results 
For four categories of brands (NB, SPL, HPL and ONB), whatever the product and the 
retailer, the direct price elasticities are negative; they are nil for LP (see Table 4). The cross 
price elasticities are seldom significantly different from zero. In the short term, consumers 
therefore react to a price variation by adjusting their demand for the brand they normally 
purchase, but without turning to another brand. Binkley et al (2001) obtain the same result in 
the case of orange juice: direct price elasticities of NBs and PLs are significantly different 
from zero and the cross price elasticities are nil. The overall quality of the regressions is 
acceptable. We observe that the value of R² is more linked to the product (they are higher for 
pasta and biscuits) than to the retailer. Furthermore, as the data is presented in the form of 
time series, we have ensured that the residuals are not strongly correlated. The results of the 
tests (Durbin Watson and Box and Pierce) lead us to accept the null hypothesis of no residual 
correlation. The short time lag (week) and the absence of seasonality related to the products 
studied explain why the residuals exhibit the characteristics of a random white noise. 
[ Table 4 here ] 
 
 The elasticities of NBs and SPLs are often close to one whereas the elasticities with 
the lowest absolute value are related to the LP and ONB. On the other hand, HPL have a high 
price elasticity.  
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The objective of this study being to capture the brand impact on own-price elasticities, 
we aim to check for other sources of variability, namely the heterogeneity of products and 
retailers. We therefore estimate the following hedonic equation where we regress the elasticity 
variable (45 observations) on three characteristics: brand, retailer and product:  
1 1 1
1 1 1
I J P
ijp i i j j p p ijp
i j p
M E P uε α β γ µ− − −
= = =
= + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  
where ijpε is the direct price elasticity of product p sold under brand i at retailer j. Dummy 
variables are created to isolate the brand effect (M), the retailer effect (E) and the product 
effect (P). 
The reference good used is the product “LP pasta sold by retailer 1”. The regression 
results are presented in Table 5. Note that to calculate the expected values for each elasticity, 
one must add to the elasticity of the reference good measured by the constant (-0.58), the 
values associated with the characteristics concerned. For example, the expected elasticity for 
SPL biscuits sold in retail shop 2 is equal to -1.21. 
[Table 5 here ] 
All direct price elasticities are negative. This result also applies in the case of biscuits 
despite the positive coefficient associated with this product. A mean test shows that the direct 
price elasticities do not differ according to the retailers (the coefficients associated with 
retailers 2 and 3 are not different from zero). Similarly, the product effect is limited to biscuits 
whose elasticity is half a point lower than that of other products.  
 
Contrary to the most common hypothesis, the demand for SPL is not more elastic to 
prices than the demand for NBs. A mean-test of equality shows that the gap between the two 
coefficients is indeed not significant. The reactions of buyers to variations in the prices of 
both types of brands exhibit comparable levels of intensity (in both cases, the elasticity is 
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close to one): when there is a price increase, the demand for PLs does not decrease more than 
the demand for NBs. In other words, consumers' attachment to PL and NB is therefore the 
same. This conclusion is contrary to that of Binkley et al (2001) who show that SPL had a 
more fragile position on the American market in 1991. 
This evolution can be explained by the rise in the perceived quality of SPL (intrinsic 
quality, packaging, shelf space) and by a learning effect among consumers. The latter has 
increased consumers’ loyalty to PLs, which has reinforced their attachment to the brand by 
avoiding the extrinsic cue premium. According to Tourtoulou, Dietsch and Krémer (2000), 
advertising for a brand results in a fall in direct price elasticity. This phenomenon clearly 
indicates an attachment by the consumer to this brand. For SPL products, a similar 
phenomenon occurs with consumer loyalty to a retailer. Bergès and Orozco (2009) show that 
when households have a choice between 6 different retail stores, all located within a 20 km 
radius, they shop in 3 retail stores on average; furthermore, a large percentage of households 
are characterized by a high index of store loyalty. These elements also contribute to 
consumers’ attachment to PLs.  
 However, note that the highest elasticities in absolute value are those related to HPL. 
The introduction of these upmarket retailers’ brands on store shelves is recent: their reputation 
must therefore develop and product maturity has not been reached yet. The elasticity values of 
HPL must be compared with the direct price elasticities of other national brands, positioned 
on the same segment in terms of quality and specificity (organic products, products with a 
registered designation of origin…). The demand for these products is not elastic to prices. 
This segment comprises the high quality national brands (the distribution of which is not as 
widespread as that of the better known leading national brands), commercializing niche 
products which are close in characteristics to those sold in the delicatessen sections of the 
retail stores. The demand for this type of product is probably associated with a low price 
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sensitivity and a high perceived quality. Consumers do not yet perceive HPL products as close 
substitutes for ONB products.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The introduction by retailers of their own private labels has been an important stage in the 
attempts by the mass distribution industry to gain a dominant position as an economic actor. 
Indeed, they have enabled this sector to go beyond its retail function and to gain the status of 
manufacturer. These private labels have shifted the balance of power from the manufacturers 
of national brands to the retail groups . What is more, private labels represent for mass 
retailers a direct source of profit increase as the margins on SPL products are known to be 
20% higher on average than those gained on other products, and they reinforce consumers’ 
store loyalty (Bonfrer and Chintagunta, 2004).. Our results indeed show that in the last few 
years, these products have gained the loyalty of consumers by reducing the buyers’ sensitivity 
to prices and by increasing their market shares. With respect to HPL, which represent a 
strategy implemented more recently by the mass distribution industry, the market shares are 
already significant, if we bear in mind that the first objective of this strategy is to assert the 
presence of the mass distribution sector on the segment of high quality products. The high 
quality products supporting this strategy do not necessarily yield high profits, nor do they 
achieve high market shares (Randall, Ulrich and Reibstein, 1997). The balance of power 
between HPL and ONB products within retail stores in 2005 is comparable to that observed in 
the 1990s between SPL and NB products. The notoriety of what we have called ONB (Other 
national brands) products is greater than that of the upmarket private labels: consumers do not 
hesitate to pay a little more to keep buying the same product. However, it is reasonable to 
believe that the situation is not set in stone and that the selling power of retailers is sufficient 
to positively influence consumers’ perception of and attachment to HPL products.  
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In addition to the standard segment and upmarket one, the distribution network 
develops low prices. Direct competitors of such products are hard discount retailers. The 
purpose of this research is to study the competition between NB/PL within the mass food 
retail sector. The hard discount stores are not included in the analysis, which does not allow a 
relevant study of the role of first price products. Until recent years, competition between 
national brands and private labels took place moderately on the standard quality segment. 
Large retailers are now expanding their own brand strategy in the high quality segment, 
whose market share is significant because it represents approximately 15% (HPL +ONB). 
In the future, competition among brands of large retailers will therefore cover the full 
spectrum of quality from the lowest price (in order not to lose market share relatively from 
hard discount) to high quality products. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 : Market shares, in volume and in value, 
of Private Labels in the mass food retail sector in France. 
 
Year Market share - 
volume Market share - value 
1993 17 na 
1996 20 na 
2000 24 20 
2005 32 25 
2007 34 29 
Source : ACNielsen in PLMA 2007. 
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Table 2: Retail Group: Descriptive statistics, period 2004-2005 period 
2004-
2005 
NB SPL HPL ONB LP 
Market 
 Share 
% 
Price € 
(standard 
deviation) 
Market 
 Share 
% 
Price € 
(standard 
deviation) 
Market 
 Share 
% 
Price € 
(standard 
deviation) 
Market  
Share 
% 
Price € 
(standard 
deviation) 
Market  
Share 
% 
Price € 
(standard 
deviation) 
Pasta 
Retailer 
1 60.5 
1.73  
(0.08) 27.6 
1.05  
(0.07) 2.6 
3.14  
(0.18) 9 
3.00  
(0.46) 0.3 
0.82  
(0.17) 
Retailer 
2 60 
1.74  
(0.16) 18.6 
1.18  
(0.87) 10.1 
2.70  
(0.12) 8.9 
2.90  
(0.31) 2.4 
0.50  
(0.05) 
Retailer 
3 65 
1.70  
(0.09) 16 
1.06  
(0.03) 4.3 
2.55  
(0.16) 9.7 
2.76  
(0.28) 4.3 
0.49  
(0.01) 
Biscuits 
Retailer 
1 42.3 
5.04  
(0.41) 31.5 
2.74  
(0.26) 1.1 
5.85  
(1.46) 20.4 
6.70  
(0.62) 4.7 
2.80  
(0.33) 
Retailer 
2 40 
5.00  
(0.43) 19 
4.36  
(0.45) 1.8 
9.50  
(1.32) 19.5 
7.39  
(0.47) 18.7 
2.01  
(0.23) 
Retailer 
3 42 
4.68  
(0.30) 17.4 
4.13  
(0.30) 2.6 
7.39  
(1.12) 17.3 
7.44  
(0.49) 20.6 
1.94  
(0.13) 
Jam 
Retailer 
1 48 
3.84  
(0.15) 27 
2.80  
(0.15) 4.4 
6.13  
(0.16) 16 
6.33  
(0.81) 4.3 
1.26  
(0.16) 
Retailer 
2 35 
3.88  
(0.31) 43 
2.79  
(0.27) 8 
5.50  
(0.72) 6.5 
6.96  
(1.62) 7 
1.04  
(0.12) 
Retailer 
3 42.6 
3.82  
(0.24) 30.4 
2.44  
(0.09) 5.2 
6.30  
(0.14) 18 
6.02  
(0.70) 3.7 
1.04  
(0.10) 
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Table 3: Promotion rate per brand, product and retailer in 2004-2005. 
Presence of a 
promotion 
2004-2005 
NB SPL HPL ONB LP  
Average rate per 
retailer Rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Pasta 
Retailer 1 26.2 0.09 
42.3 
0.14 
8.51 
0.83 
22.2 
0.11 
0.7 
0.14 22.71  
Retailer 2 28.9 0.15 
26 
0.14 
12.9 
0.93 
21.3 
0.13 
10.6 
0.10 13.46  
Retailer 3 21.6 0.08 
12.32 
0.07 
25.41 
0.08 
26.07 
0.10 
14.58 
0.06 23.09  
Biscuits 
Retailer 1 16.4 0.09 
46.2 
0.10 
1.99 
0.02 
27.8 
0.11 
7.5 
0.06 18.57  
Retailer 2 14 0.06 
11 
0.09 
0.8 
0.01 
24.8 
0.13 
49.5 
0.14 15.44  
Retailer 3 12.4 0.04 
10 
0.05 
5.4 
0.03 
21.7 
0.07 
50 
0.08 19.44  
Jam 
Retailer 1 22 0.32 
28.8 
0.24 
7.5 
0.01 
19.8 
0.21 
22.8 
0.25 11.55  
Retailer 2 22 0.31 
41.4 
0.32 
7.2 
0.20 
8 
0.14 
15.2 
0.20 13.44  
Retailer 3 25.3 0.27 
31.4 
0.22 
7.9 
0.10 
29 
0.25 
2.5 
0.12 10.30  
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Table 4: Price elasticities and quality of the regression 
 
AIDS 
NB SPL HPL ONB LP 
Price 
elasticity 
(standard 
deviation) 
R² 
(adjusted) 
Price 
elasticity 
(standard 
deviation) 
R² 
(adjusted) 
Price 
elasticity 
(standard 
deviation) 
R² 
(adjusted) 
Price 
elasticity 
(standard 
deviation) 
R² 
(adjusted) 
Price 
elasticity 
(standard 
deviation) 
R² 
(adjusted) 
Pasta 
Retailer 1 -1.01** (0.11) 0.42 
-0.74** 
(0.17) 0.43 
-1.84** 
(0.62) 0.48 
-0.54** 
(0.19) 0.47 
2.38 
(2.63) -- 
Retailer 2 -1.36** (0.08) 0.68 
-2.2** 
(0.22) 0.72 
-2.56** 
(0.58) 0.32 
-1.36** 
(0.25) 0.30 
-1.30 
(1.13) -- 
Retailer 3 -1.13** (0.08) 0.62 
-2.31** 
(0.41) 0.52 
-2.21** 
(0.64) 0.54 
-0.42** 
(0.25) 0.56 
-2.85** 
(0.90) -- 
Biscuits 
Retailer 1 -0.87** (0.09) 0.57 
-0.94** 
(0.11) 0.49 
-1.25** 
(0.30) 0.19 
-0.62** 
(0.18) 0.41 
-0.08 
(0.48) -- 
Retailer 2 -0.99** (0.11) 0.47 
-1.18** 
(0.13) 0.54 
-2.23** 
(0.55) 0.33 
-0.67** 
(0.21) 0.5 
-0.56** 
(0.15) -- 
Retailer 3 -0.77** (0.11) 0.58 
-0.90** 
(0.18) 0.51 
-1.38** 
(0.26) 0.29 
-0.63** 
(0.18) 0.40 
-0.55** 
(0.16) -- 
Jam 
Retailer 1 -0.99** (0.22) 0.32 
-1.53** 
(0.27) 0.26 
-3.37** 
(1.56) 0.14 
-0.64** 
(0.23) 0.22 
-0.05 
(0.61) -- 
Retailer 2 -1.76** (0.21) 0.34 
-1.28** 
(0.14) 0.45 
-0.58 
(0.53) 0.36 
-0.82 
(0.28) 0.19 
-0.21 
(0.83) -- 
Retailer 3 -1.25** (0.17) 0.20 
-1.00** 
(0.24) 0.28 
-2.5** 
(0.88) 0.32 
-0.73** 
(0.19) 0.18 
0.17 
(0.95) -- 
** = estimator significant at 5%; * = estimator significant at 10% 
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Table 5: Linear regression of own price elasticity 
Variables Coefficient t-Student 
NB -0.53 -1.90 
SPL -0.75 -2.67 
HPL -1.46 -5.21 
ONB -0.12 -0.43 
Retailer 2 -0.35 -1.59 
Retailer 3 -0.29 -1.32 
Biscuit 0.47 2.14 
Jam 0.14 0.65 
Constant -0.58 -2.20 
Adjusted R²  0.44 
 
 
 
 
